Exclusive interview with Shenyu: The first time to disclose the process of being fished for 12,000 ETH, which gives safety advice to the startup team

Author: Wu Shuo Blockchain

This discussion began with the stolen $1.5 billion by Bybit, focusing on security vulnerabilities and solutions for multi-signed wallets (such as Safe). Shenyu pointed out that there are weak links in the front-end, hardware, browser and other infrastructure that rely on for multiple signing wallets, especially the front-end tampering and blind signing problems, which leads to inconsistent transaction intentions and are easily exploited by hackers. To this end, he proposed temporary solutions such as domain name whitelists, transaction analysis plug-ins, and advocated an end-to-end closed-loop risk control system, combining AI and third-party verification to improve security. In addition, Shenyu shared for the first time his personal experience of being fished for 12,000 ETH last year, emphasizing the risk of blind signing for hardware wallets, calling on the industry to adopt a layered decentralized and zero-trust architecture, and strengthen the construction of a security culture. He also mentioned that in the face of national-level hacking attacks, the industry needs to respond to challenges through technological iteration and security awareness improvement. Finally, Shenyu looks forward to the combination of AI and Crypto, believing that in the future, AI Agent may play an important role in blockchain networks and promote industry innovation.

Reflect on the loopholes in the multi-sign dependence infrastructure,

propose temporary solutions such as domain name whitelists, transaction analysis plug-ins, and advocate end-to-end closed-loop wind control

Colin: Please share your views on this Bybit incident and what points are worth paying attention to in this incident.

Shenyu: This time is actually a very typical situation. Because the current industry solutions need to rely on many infrastructure and intermediate services, which are developed by multiple companies. In the traditional sense, it is not easy to cause problems if this is more decentralized and decentralized, but the problem now is that there are some bugs in the interaction between these applications developed by multiple companies and hardware technologies, and some points that may be easily weak. This has led to a series of large-scale security accidents that have occurred in the past period of time, facing national-level hacking forces. The essence of this problem is that I have been reflecting on this issue after being attacked in September last year. We also contacted various hardware manufacturers around November. We realized that blind signing is a serious problem, and the connection between front-end plug-ins to desktop to hardware is also easily tampered with. We realized that this is the weakest point. At that time, I also contacted OneKey, Ledger and other companies to discuss some solutions. During this process, we found some problems and each company had some solutions, but it was difficult to finally implement this solution and resist the attack. As someone mentioned just now, it may take more than half a year to iterate well, and then Ledger actually made a systematic solution. Due to contract reasons, they need to be passively updated, and this cycle is also very long. This is how this full link can better block bugs caused by loopholes or crossovers.

Now the market actually lacks an end-to-end solution. Now it is used to combine it with each company, but there will be accidents in the process of combining, giving hackers an opportunity to take advantage of it. In this process, I actually meant that we first made some internal gadgets and some demos. First, we first made a whitelist of domain name access to ensure that the website opened by the web page is fine, not tampered with, and can prevent some typical phishing attacks, especially things like entering the wrong URL and jumping randomly on the web page. Then secondly, we made a transaction analysis plug-in, which can be run on the mobile terminal. Some hardware wallets and plug-ins or Safe are even transmitted through QR code communication. We check whether the QR code has been tampered with, and then verify the parsed content on the hardware wallet. I made some small plug-ins, but I felt that it was too scattered after using it. The entire end-to-end process was not completely stringed up, and there were too many steps to use it. So after this incident, we will continue to reflect.

A very core point is that our industry is already very large, with trillions of dollars, which will inevitably cause attacks from high-standard hacking teams. In this process, like our team classmates also mentioned that you have to dig very deep horizontally and vertically. However, because the industry does develop very quickly and iterate very quickly, people often ignore this series of potential risks when doing business. So in this process, what we are currently thinking or what we are doing is to say that we hope that because we have always managed various private keys (hardware, private keys on the software chain), and then accumulated a series of risk management capabilities in this process, with some risk control engines. So we hope that in a typical scenario like Safe, we can be a custodian. We will get a private key. When we get a private key, we have a completely independent software and hardware environment, plus our series of risk control engines to analyze, and then we will introduce a series of customized audit solutions in the process, plus automated AI analysis, plus manual audit, and then add some black and white lists to it, and even some advanced contract parameter control things.

This is actually something that we have used in the DeFi process, and we have not completely made it productive. Through such a decentralized form, some private keys are not obtained by a team, but by some external third parties independently, and then the matter can be controlled only by closing the loop end to end. This is what we think at the moment. We do operate this way in the process of on-chain DeFi operation, because EOA is indeed very easy to be phished, and migrating to multiple signs faces problems like Bybit. We have particularly long links and various risks. Our current thinking and solution is to introduce an independent third party, and then the independent third party introduces its completely independent technology stack and software-hardware solution, including a risk control engine, and even adds some AI capabilities to complete a closed loop, from the initiation analysis of transactions, risk control audits, to the cooperation with signatures, and then try to avoid the very patient and long-term penetration attacks of national-level hackers.

**Shenyu was fished and emphasized the risk of blind signing of hardware

wallets, and it is necessary to combine AI with third-party verification.**

Colin: You mentioned the issue of EOA fishing just now. We also know that some of your assets may have been accidentally fished last year. Can you recall what the situation was and whether the money was finally transferred by the so-called hacker from North Korea?

Shenyu: My background was when a project was airdropped. I was not in such an ideal state at that time, and then I was a little distracted and clicked the wrong link. There was a problem with one link. But the problem is that the funds have reached the hardware wallet side. In fact, we have a three-party risk control mechanism for domain name and DNS resolution. As a result, that solution was bypassed, and our risk control failed. After bypassing, I was a little distracted, so I didn’t check so carefully, and then I went to the hardware wallet side because there were blind signs on the hardware wallet side. Then after I pressed that, I felt something was wrong. I immediately checked it and found something was wrong. What everyone knows later. So after this incident happened, we solved the problem of blind signing for hardware wallets. During this process, during the National Day last year, we pulled OneKey and other parties to hold meetings, but we found that the problem was not so easy to solve. Because EOA is easily phished, it is especially easy to be targeted and "attacked". Then we turned to using Safe to sign multiple signs. During the process of signing multiple signs, I found that this problem somehow became more serious, because basically every transaction was a blind sign, and then we had to do a lot of small tools to try to solve these problems. In the end, we still need to have a closed-loop solution, which requires our hardware wallet to achieve the goal of hardware and software integration, because the hardware UI is indeed the last point to check, and we also need to introduce some independent third parties. In this process, it can prevent the interception of alarms and processing due to the wrong human status. Therefore, this is also some of the reasons why we started iterating and trying to productize it in this area.

**" Copycat Season" Reasons not appearing: Lack of driving force and

expectation of national reserve decisions to promote market development**

Colin: In addition, last year you first raised the issue of "alliance coins". Everyone was arguing a lot. Some people, including many well-known people, criticized that there must be "alliance coins", and some people also recognized it. Then in December last year, the "altcoin" market was indeed very short-lived. At that time, you may also think that the "altcoin" market has come and said that the "altcoin" has begun. As a result, it didn't take long before, it seemed that "altcoins" were almost non-existent in this cycle, as you said at first. Of course, we are not making predictions. For short-term predictions, I don’t know who said it before, only God knows. But now do you have some new thoughts and think that "altcoins" in this cycle are almost impossible to appear, because it may be mainly in the Bitcoin market cycle. Also, don’t you think that the so-called bull market has ended, or that it is about to start to turn into a bear market?

Shenyu: My current feeling is that in the past two or three years, in addition to some small emotional hot spots, the entire industry still lacks a very clear application and real demand scenario like 2020 and 2021. I think the essential problem is here. Because there is no endogenous driving force, no new truly valuable application assets will be accumulated. On the other hand, in this cycle, a large number of players actually stayed in the traditional US stock market. They used ETFs and traded through platforms such as Robinhood. They were not really cryptocurrency assets, so a lot of money was not actually left on the market, nor did they see the so-called spillover effect that everyone particularly wanted to expect, spreading from Bitcoin and Ethereum to other currencies. With these two factors combined, somehow, the "altcoin" market may be driven by very short-term sentiment. In just a few weeks, there was no general outbreak. I almost still maintain my previous judgment.

Then my view this year, or expectations for the market may be that I think the market development is relatively good, and it may be in the second half of this year, from June to October, and then things at the reserve level of these countries in the United States will gradually become clearer and pass, and a large amount of new funds may flow into the entire industry or market. But now, at this stage or in the medium and short term, we may not be able to solve the problem in the medium and short term in the application level. At the on-market capital level, the off-market capital level does not seem to have such a crazy inflow. So my more expectations are to be put in the second half of the year.

I don’t judge this matter today, but it may ultimately be based on whether the national reserves related to the United States can have some results this year. If there is no result, the market may end. At this moment, we feel that the probability of passing is relatively high, and it is hard to say, so we have more expectations in the second half of the year. (This Space is released on February 25, and in March, Trump has signed an executive order on the national reserves of Bitcoin)

**Summary of historical theft cases: Responding to national-level

hackers, requires layered power decentralization, zero-trust architecture and security culture penetration**

Colin: Actually, Shenyu, you are also an old player in the currency circle. After so many years, I joined in about 2017. There are so many stolen cases in the history of the currency circle, and all kinds of thrilling. Of course, the amount of Bybit stolen this time has set a historical record, but it is also profitable enough, so it can also be paid in full. In your historical memory, including the most profound experiences of being stolen in your memory at a very early age, what are the most worth sharing?

Shenyu: I think offense and defense have always been upgraded, and the earliest attack methods were very primitive. We practitioners must realize that we are facing national power. This is not ordinary hackers. They are organized and have been training intensively since they were in their teens, using various methods and methods similar to attacking core facilities to infiltrate our enterprises internally and challenge them at the human level. Everyone must clearly realize that we are facing such opponents. In this process, people will be relaxed and there will be some problems with human nature. Ultimately, we must adopt means and methods that can withstand it.

In the history of the Internet, Cobo is probably the first company in Chinese background to adopt the zero-trust model security methodology. The reason we adopt this methodology is that only this methodology has been proven and can withstand the infiltration of national forces. So we started to implement zero-trust transformation internally in 2018 and 2019, and all kinds of things must be installed on all our internal services, as well as on all employees' computers and mobile phones. So when we realize this, we must adopt this solution and then put our various systems in a state of minimum trust.

At the same time, the most core asset, for us, is the private key, and we must introduce layered, decentralized and decentralized thinking. What does stratification mean? We must disassemble the wallet very scattered. I personally shared before that I have a four-purse theory, which is on the personal level. But at the institutional level, at least there must be a wallet architecture of three layers: hot, warm and cold, and the architecture of each layer may have its own characteristics. There may be a black and white list and a series of processes, including time delays. Many times, we often compromise security and sacrifice security for efficiency, especially for efficiency, for efficiency, but mandatory time delays will reduce your security risk exposure very low, especially for the cold wallet and warm wallet. We must layer it, and then each layer must set up different security risks and establish a set of audit systems and processes to avoid these systemic risks. Cold wallets are best at the physical level, which can ensure absolute security.

Then the second is to decentralize power. Because the industry has been developing for so many years, there are more and more participants. At the earliest, we may not have a solution and can only trust our team to do something. Now, internal employees, especially when remote office is more popular, have also been infiltrated by North Korea, and even have employees with high authority within the organization, so we cannot fully believe in this internal process. Therefore, at this level, we must decentralize power. We must introduce external independent third parties to control some private keys and verify them. This is also very critical. Now there are many custodian companies, security companies, and insurance companies. They can hold private keys at different levels, some are private keys of hot wallets, some are private keys of warm wallets, and some are private keys of cold wallets. As an external independent third party, they have their own security solutions, and then do some risk management and control. Through a series of measures, the cost and threshold of attacks will be increased exponentially.

Then in the end, it is actually scattered. We may have done a better job of distributing our software and hardware on a global scale, because everyone is basically in a relatively scattered state. From this dimension, first of all, we must use a system with minimal trust and use the risk design concept of zero trust to design our entire internal system and architecture, plus the management methods of layered, decentralized, and scattered core assets, and then equip a series of software and hardware security modules, as well as strict internal access control processes, and then establish a secure life cycle closed-loop management. In addition, we may have some emergency responses and solutions during and after the event, so that we can survive for a relatively long time in high-risk and uncertain attacks.

**Compliant exchanges invest more security, while offshore exchanges are

underrepresented due to high growth pressures and insufficient security measures**

Colin: I personally want to know about compliant exchanges like Coinbase or other. To be honest, it seems that they have had fewer experiences of being stolen. Unlike offshore exchanges, there are almost no ones that are not stolen, and many exchanges have even been stolen many times. What is the reason? Actually, I don't understand very much. In theory, can offshore exchanges also use the architecture they can use? Because the amount of funds on offshore exchanges is large or the operations are different. I don't know which security guest can answer my question. In addition, Shenyu, do you think that facing such attacks from North Korean hackers will make the industry very difficult to start a business, causing the security costs of ordinary entrepreneurs, or the investment they need to become very high, which will greatly hinder the development of this industry? It feels that everyone has some doubts about whether the industry can withstand the attacks from North Korean hackers.

Shenyu: Let me add that my intuitive feeling is that compliant exchanges may value security more in terms of safety and efficiency. For example, in some aspects, they are more stuck, so they have invested a lot in safety.

Theoretically, offshore exchanges have a lot of funds, and they can invest more in security. Whether it was the early Binance or other things, including this time, it felt that theft was still quite frequent.

Maybe it is because the pressure on the growth of offshore exchanges is too great, and it needs to be iterated frequently, and users have more customer complaints. However, in compliant exchanges, ordinary users’ expectations are not that high, and the requirements for withdrawal of coins are not as fast as possible. Even large-scale withdrawals are T+1 and T+2. I have even seen T+7, and users can accept it because the customer base is different, and the customer base of compliant exchanges is mainly institutions. These two exchanges may have a long history. I don’t know that I have experienced these things that have been stolen. I should have a lot of experience in dealing with security issues. I can basically regard security issues as a "coming-come gift" for the company.

I think as long as you have enough profit margin in this industry, investing in some SaaS-based products will definitely be able to try to meet the pain points and needs of this industry. However, now everyone is not that strong in terms of security awareness or willingness to pay. We have also seen many very good safety products, but everyone earns hard money, and even the costs are difficult to balance, and they need to rely on other aspects to subsidize.

This level is actually a problem, but I feel that with the upgrading of offense and defense, everyone has gradually realized that security is a very important thing, and they will invest more and more in security, which also provides companies like those focusing on safe SaaS to develop a certain amount of development space and capital. From a security perspective and architectural perspective, there are effective and verified solutions. However, in the case of Safe, there are about four to five participants upstream and downstream. It really needs to complete a transaction. The coordination between each participant is very slow, and the hardware iteration is particularly slow, so in the end, there is a time window for the hacker.

Once the problems in the blockchain industry are fully exposed and discussed, these problems should be solved through one or two cycles of iteration. In addition, Web2 also faces similar problems, although the resources invested in Web2 to security issues are not as large as the blockchain industry. We have seen that Passkey, which is for password security, has been implemented for many years and has finally started to be used on a large scale in the past one or two years, especially in some sensitive financial fields. Therefore, these technologies can be reused and developed at the bottom of the board, including the Apple devices we use, etc., which are also iterating rapidly at the security level. In the end, there is a solution, which may just require a certain amount of time and capital investment. In this process, some developers with weak risk awareness and more radical behavior may bear some costs, but the problem can be solved.

**Entrepreneur safety advice: Practice the zero trust model, multi-audit

cross-verification, regular safety drills**

Colin: For entrepreneurs, a startup project was stolen recently, although many people in the community are supporting them. As a person with many years of experience in the safety of entrepreneurial projects, you have experienced so much. What suggestions can you give entrepreneurs better awareness of safety?

Shenyu: I think in the process of starting a business, we must practice the zero-trust model well, which is very critical. Only in the current environment can this set of methodology and concepts protect everyone. At the same time, some single point of failure and single-party contract audit cannot be relied on. The basic requirement is that at least two or three companies must conduct the audit and some cross-verification is required, so that some problems can be exposed in this process. And don’t pay too fast the amount of funds. In the early stage, you can slowly get the amount of funds through some internal tests and public tests, and isolate the funds, so that risks can be managed relatively well.

In fact, there are many security solutions in the industry that are not expensive, such as safe monitoring and risk control systems. Everyone should use them, which can greatly increase the probability of survival.

In the process of entrepreneurship, on the one hand, the business model must consider the user side, especially for entrepreneurs without technical backgrounds, who must spend a lot of attention on security and internal zero-trust architecture, and at least 20% of the attention should be paid to this. If these internal safety culture and systems are not emphasized at the company level, and safety phishing tests and offensive and defense drills are conducted internally from time to time, from the employee level and human level, everyone will be lazy. You should know that there may be hackers staring at you at any time. Therefore, resources and attention must be focused on security.

Colin: Yes, I think there is almost no company in the process of growing this industry, whether it is the boss or the company, that will not be the experience of being stolen. Fortunately, as long as this time it is not defeated, both individuals and the entire industry will make some progress.

**Why not participate in this round of Memecoin: physical discomfort,

focus on AI**

Web3 Dumplings: Shenyu, you have been in the crypto industry and are also a well-known person in this industry. At the beginning, Cobo Wallet might have taken everyone to mine, and I was the first to participate in these. Under this year's market conditions, I found that Shenyu has little to say about industry-related matters. Including the link posted today, the PVP mentioned is just a simple mention. What I am more concerned about is that for the industry, it seems that after the previous wave of market, the industry has reached a bottleneck. I would like to ask Shenyu, where is the next trend?

Colin: Yes, Shenyu, you have always liked to play with all kinds of new things, but it seems that this round of Meme is so popular, and you haven’t seen any special participation. What is the reason?

Shenyu: If you don’t play Meme, the main reason is that my body really can’t stand it and I can’t compare with the post-00s. Another factor is that my recent focus has been on AI, which looks like there may be some disruptive combination with cryptocurrencies in the future, which may lead to new increments. We have proposed in an offline event more than a year ago that the final user of cryptocurrencies may be AI Agents or AI robots, not humans, so I have spent a lot of energy on learning to use AI. I really can’t play PVP anymore. I usually participate in it and give everyone money, and there is not much positive feedback, so the main focus is on AI.

**Looking forward to the prospect of combining AI with Crypto, it

believes that AI Agent may play an important role in blockchain networks in the future**

Colin: What do you think of AI now? Because there was a wave of so-called AI Agent before, and it was falling very hard. Many friends around me have gone bankrupt after speculating on AI. Do you think the AI ​​agent in the previous section produces anything attractive? What are the best application directions for AI and cryptocurrencies in the future?

Shenyu: I think the lowest core is that AI’s own capabilities have not yet reached that stage, and it is still some things in the proof of concepts. Then we can see that AI is developing very fast, and the underlying computing power model is constantly iterating. We hope that AI can reach a future state, that is, having general AGI (artificial intelligence).

There are two things about cryptocurrency stuff. On the one hand, it is very friendly to things that are completely digital because the data is open and transparent. So on the one hand, AI may change the interaction mode. For these complex smart contracts and anti-human security operations, we should be able to rely on some reliable and intelligent AI agents to help us make some auxiliary decisions. I like to joke now that I am now operating decentralized finance and must arrange several AI agents to help me watch. This may really be the case in the future. Artificial intelligence engineers and one or two AI agents are still looking at the screen. Looking further, it is possible that AI will really be connected to the blockchain network.

We envision a scenario where AI agents need to interact, including exchange of value and data, which may also involve contract-level things, and even companies or DAOs with loose forms. They may use smart contract platforms for some value-level exchanges. I was thinking that in the next three or five years, something similar to a web social network or a value social network may be formed on the blockchain, and this will ultimately be used by this bunch of AI agents. Once this thing appears, the value and influence it may bring may be very great. We have always talked about the network effect of Web3. The asset scale or value brought by this thing may be much larger than the traditional Internet companies we see now, so this may be something higher than the current trillion scale. I've been thinking about what the hell is and what we can do in it. I am quite optimistic. Although the industry has not yet emerged in good application directions in the past two or three years, I think it should appear in the future and there are still some obstacles that we may be able to solve, so I am looking forward to that day.

**Safe wallet blind signing problem solution: enterprise signing tools +

AI risk control + black and white list management**

TheCheerSong: I am a trader doing on-chain automated trading. After this incident, when our business cannot be stopped, we are also upgrading our security measures. I feel that the most troublesome part is the blind signing part of the Safe wallet. What we can do now is that we have some open source permission control modules here, and we apply it to the Safe wallet. In this usage process, most transaction requests are automated, so Safe wallets are basically only used to perform manual transfer operations of some tokens. I would like to ask all teachers, for relatively simple requests, are there any tools to verify our signature content?

Shenyu: Actually, someone mentioned just now that we will release it next week. We have productized this set of internal tools and released this set of Safe's corporate signature tools. The essence is to obtain a Safe private key, and then add some black and white lists through the machine, including some risk control templates. You can customize some common risk control methods, such as limiting the token limit and transaction speed, setting black and white lists, plus some capabilities of AI Agent, and considering some large losses. We can sort out this process clearly and manage risks well.

This solution is combined with Cobo's previous contracts based on access control lists on the Argus chain and parameter-level control. I feel that at present, only by doing this can I feel at ease when I really trade my large amount of funds on the chain. This is the security practice we are using.

**Opinions of various security experts on wallet security issues in Bybit

stolen incidents**

During this Space, BlockSec CEO Professor Chou Yajin, OneKey Chief Growth Officer Nig and Cobo Chief Security Officer Moon also expressed their views.

Regarding the security issues of the exchange in the Bybit incident, Professor Zhou Yajin said that the incident was due to the inconsistent operation of the operation and actual transactions when managing funds using Safe contract wallets, resulting in malicious upgrades and funds stolen. The reason has not been made public yet. Many project parties believe that using Safe multi-signature to manage wallets is safe, but in fact, they ignore the fact that security is a system construction covering operational, non-technical and technical levels. There are loopholes in private key management and transaction interpretation, such as insufficient storage, signature and transaction analysis and interpretation, which ensures the physical security of private keys, which is poorly handled by user-friendliness. The trust chain for large-scale funds transfer is long, but there is a lack of dual verification of transaction interpretation and operation interface information by third parties. Therefore, using contract wallets to manage large-scale funds requires third-party verification and certification. A whitelist or decentralization should be set up to implement flexible strategic control on contract wallets.

Regarding the security of Safe wallet front-end tampering and mainstream multi-signature solutions Safe, Moon believes that the Safe solution and contracts themselves are relatively safe, but the trust chain is long when applied, which is prone to unexpected situations. This time Bybit is likely to be attacked on the outsourcing level, not contract issues, which highlights the importance of daily security awareness. The safe use of Safe wallets requires consideration from the vertical and horizontal directions. Each link in the vertical direction must have controllable technical solutions, such as independent devices, etc.; multiple signs in horizontal direction require independent verification by signers, and a long trust chain is likely to cause links to cross, and hackers can bypass verification. Therefore, horizontal expansion not only requires increasing the number of signers, but also ensures that the signature plan and environment are independent and verified by each individual to give full play to the role of Safe. In addition, in addition to using contract wallets, exchanges and high-net-worth individuals should also establish strict mechanisms such as manual reconciliation and monitoring abnormalities, use automated procedures to review, and improve security awareness to avoid Web2 attacks. In addition, Cobo will also launch a management solution of MPC and Safe, which will take advantage of Safe's multi-signature capabilities to allow different signers to have independent and complete end-to-end signature links.

Regarding the issues related to hardware wallets in the Bybit incident, Nig said that Bybit uses NPC to control EOA wallets (because their signatures are easy to resolve), while the Safe smart contract wallet signature is complex and difficult to resolve, and the security team may not detect it in time. Existing hardware wallets (such as Ledger) have limited performance and are difficult to deal with complex smart contract analysis and blind signing. If measures have been taken early may be avoided, the Shenyu team and OneKey have developed related analysis tools. Ledger's Clear Signing is progressing slowly, and signature data is easily contaminated from networked devices. It is not enough to rely solely on hardware wallet analysis to ensure the consistency of intentions. Bybit lacks early warning this time, after the first signer was invaded, someone else blindly signed due to equipment problems. It is recommended that high-net-worth individuals and institutions separate the network equipment related to fund transactions and isolate them from office equipment to reduce the risk of intrusion. Previously, Radium was invaded or not due to the environment.

Regarding the application of Safe security, third-party monitoring functions and AI in blockchain security, Professor Zhou Yajin believes that the Safe contract is relatively safe in the past and has been reviewed by multiple parties, but the long use process brings risks. The falcon Safe security system developed by its team can examine user transactions from a third-party perspective, analyze transaction content, remind key transaction information such as transfers and contract interaction, lower user awareness thresholds and avoid security issues. In terms of AI applications, on the one hand, AI reduces the cost of doing evil and facilitates batch generation of phishing tools; on the other hand, the industry is exploring the combination of AI and auditing and automated audit code. Although it is far from the ideal state, AI can lower the threshold for cryptocurrency users to use products and help solve the problems of complex user operations.

Regarding the issues related to hardware wallets, Nig responded that the company will not send war reports like some peers who were stolen on exchanges to promote a significant increase in sales. Although sales increase is good, it also reflects that many people just value private key security. The hardware wallet is responsible for this security accident. Ledger and Safe performed less than expected. Safe has stopped front-end and native support. The previous generation of hardware wallets has limited resolution capabilities due to security considerations. New generation products such as Ultra and Pro will strengthen local complex contract analysis, support the analysis of core transaction elements, and Classic will also select key parts to display; the APP will implement mainstream EVM transaction analysis, and the hardware side will be tested a little later due to security. In response to Safe, methods to resist related attacks will be demonstrated in the near future and user security education will be carried out. In the future, although there are diverse technologies, such as OKX is not active in accessing hardware wallets and institutions promote NPC wallets, the signature process exposes risks of mnemonic words in the networked environment, so hardware wallets always focus on the physical isolation core. Even if there are changes such as upgrading of mnemonic words standards, the core security defense will not change.