A wool-pull-up car? One article reveals the beginning and end of the contract storm of Bitget VOXEL

Author: Fairy, ChainCatcher

Edited by: TB, ChainCatcher

Profit screenshots and contract operation record videos have spread on social platforms, quickly aroused the emotional wave of the entire community.

A thrilling "arbitrage game" appeared on the VOXEL perpetual contract on Bitget. This feast that seemed to be "wool from the sky" eventually became the focus of a storm. In just a few hours, from the surge in trading volume to the soaring capital fee rate, to risk control restrictions and transaction rollback, the entire incident was full of controversy and countless questions.

This article will sort out the incident process, analyze the "arbitrage" path and Bitget's funding rate mechanism, and clear away layers of fog for everyone.

A "wool" carnival sets off a storm across the Internet

On the afternoon of April 20, the VOXEL/USDT perpetual contract on the Bitget trading platform suddenly "sky", and the price continued to fluctuate violently between US$0.125 and US$0.148. The trading volume instantly increased, and the trading volume of VOXEL contracts exceeded US$12.7 billion that day, surpassing the mainstream currency of the platform.

During this period, the Bitget contract holdings and trading volume far exceeded other exchanges

The community began to suspect that the Bitget market maker robot might have loopholes and continue to make mistakes in orders, resulting in abnormal liquidity.

At the same time, many KOLs and community users have posted one after another, pointing out that there may be a "risk-free arbitrage" window for this contract, and some people have achieved huge returns in a short period of time through high-frequency operations. It is said that some users traded repeatedly with 100 USDT principal, making a profit of more than 100,000 USDT; some users earned 7,000 USDT with 200 USDT, with a yield of as high as 35 times. Various profitable screenshots and operational videos spread rapidly on social platforms.

However, many users soon found that their accounts were frozen and their funds could not be withdrawn. Bitget then responded that some accounts were temporarily restricted from operating due to trading activities. In the evening, Xie Jiayin, the head of Bitget Chinese, said that some accounts have completed transaction rollback and resumed transactions, recharges and other functions. If the risk control restrictions cause the liquidation, the platform will be fully responsible.

At this point, this storm surrounding arbitrage, mechanisms, and platform processing methods continues to ferment in the community.

" VOXEL" ********Path disassembly

In addition to community controversy, the arbitrage path of "100 U to more than 100,000 U" is also eye-catching. According to community user @suwanyu7777, the entire operation logic is not complicated. The key is to take advantage of the violent fluctuations in a specific range and cooperate with the abnormalities of the platform market making system to achieve profit harvesting.

1. Lock the abnormal oscillation range

First of all, some users observed that the price of VOXEL/USDT contract fluctuated rapidly within a fixed range (such as 0.135-0.148 US dollars), and the trading volume increased significantly. This abnormality may be caused by the failure of the market maker robot's algorithm, which leads to automatic acceptance of orders in a specific price range , thus opening a window of "risk-free arbitrage".

2. Setting up trading strategies

Arbitrageurs usually use high leverage and simple strategy paths:

• Build long positions at low levels: if you place a long order at US$ 0.135 ;
• Set take profit at high level: Set take profit at USD 0.148;
• Fast transaction locks profit: Due to the error of the market making system, the stop-profit order can be sold in almost instant.

3. High frequency compound interest operation

Since the price fluctuates frequently within a specific range and the robot continues to "cooperate", users can repeatedly turn on the multi-stop profit operation, locking in small profits each time. Through high-frequency trading, profits accumulate rapidly.

" Amplifier" funding rate

Behind this arbitrage feast, the capital rate of the VOXEL contract also fluctuated extremely abnormally. It once soared to the "top" level of -2%, far exceeding the common normal range of 0.01% to 0.1%. After the incident, community discussions about Bitget funding rates were caused. In order to clarify this mechanism, we have consulted the relevant instructions on the Bitget official website.

Its capital rate consists of two parts: "interest rate (I)" and "premium index (P)", and a buffer of ±0.05% is set, and the upper and lower limits of capital rate are set to restrict the occurrence of extreme values.

The core formula is:

Fund rate (F) = Clamp([Average Premium Index (P) + Clamp (Interest Rate (I)

• Average Premium Index (P), -0.05%, 0.05%)], Fund rate lower limit, Fund rate upper limit)

Among them, the premium index measures the degree of deviation between market trading orders and index prices:

Premium Index (P) = [Max(0, impact buying price - index price) - Max(0, index price - impact selling price)]/index price

Interest rates are dynamically set according to time intervals:

Interest rate (I) = (0.03%)/Fund interval, Fund interval = 24/Fund interval time

The core of this mechanism of Bitget is the principle of "weighted average premium", which calculates the interest rate and the average premium index per minute, and then calculates its weighted average per minute every N hours. The closer you are to the settlement time, the greater the coefficient of the premium index. Ultimately, the funding fee paid or obtained by the user is equal to the position value × the funding fee rate.

However, under the stacking of extreme sentiment and high leverage, this mechanism originally designed for "price anchoring" may also become an amplifier of market sentiment. When the capital fee rate fell to -2%, the profit margin of arbitrageurs was greatly magnified, attracting more speculators to flock in, forming a spiral acceleration.

The path to trust in crisis

Since the incident has fermented, a large number of "online public relations consultants" have emerged on the X platform, providing advice to Bitget for "crisis handling guidelines": some suggest that the platform roll back funds to compensate damaged users, set up a BGB mining pool, and distribute the remaining funds to BGB holders, reflecting the platform's responsibility; some suggest that market makers make frankly explain the operational errors and pay compensation to damaged users, while abnormal profit accounts will be resolved by market makers and users.

In addition, many voices have put forward constructive ideas around "enhancing user stickiness", such as: keeping accounts that make normal profits within a certain fluctuation range, and considering settlement in the form of partial profit + BGB installment unlocking for frequent and high-frequency arbitrage behaviors; at the same time, it is recommended to establish a "platform optimization suggestion fund" to reward users with abnormal mechanisms or loopholes, so as to guide the community to build an ecosystem together.

Public opinion is still fermenting, but the storm also reflects users' higher expectations for the platform. In a high-leverage and fast-paced market, even a tiny crack may pry the next storm. Only by continuing to learn and actively evolve can the platform stabilize its course between risk and trust.